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As Theresa May and the Labour Party continue to engage in 
discussions over trying to find a “compromise” agreement that could 
command a majority in Parliament, talk again turns to Labour seeking 
to extract “guarantees” from the Government that leaving the EU will 
not be accompanied by a further diminution of worker rights – in a 
form that could not be undone by a would-be future Brexiteer Prime 
Minister. The sincerity of such talks and their potential to effect any 
meaningful agreement aside, they do highlight the increasingly 
precarious nature of work in the UK, and in particular the gig economy 
and the technological changes that have driven developments in 
these areas thereof. 
As such, automation and digitalisation are having a transformative 
effect on production and work organisation in the UK and other 
countries. These changes, often associated with the “gig economy”, 
have been argued to constitute a “Fourth Industrial Revolution” (4IR) – 
a revolution that has been epitomised by such technologies being 
“seamlessly embedded into our physical environment” (Philbeck and 
Davis, 2019: 18). The 4IR then builds on the Third Industrial 
Revolution, which saw the development of digital technologies, and 
this in turn built on the Second Industrial Revolution of electricity and 
telecommunications (ibid.). However, the 4IR promises far more 
dramatic changes to society, or even what it means to be human, than 
just the widespread application of machine-learning algorithms. 
These technological developments have the potential to render many 
of today’s jobs redundant. New technological developments in areas 
such as robotic process automation (RPA), drones, the Internet of 
Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning are 
continuing to impact upon production and society. What is evident 
with these technologies is their intimate complementarity and that use 
of one invariably invokes use of another. Drones, for example, could 
easily be used by an on-line retailer such as Amazon in concert with 
the IoT and/or an RPA to entirely remove the human worker element 
from purchasing and despatching a product to a customer. 
Indeed, some writers predict that in 10 to 20 years, half of current jobs 
will be “threatened by algorithms” and that “40% of today’s top 500 
companies will have vanished in a decade” (Helbing et al., 2017: 3). 
Similarly, Frey and Osborne (2013), basing their article on John 
Maynard Keynes’ (1933) famous prediction of “widespread 
technological unemployment” (ibid. 2) suggested that algorithms 
“could substitute for approximately 140 million full-time knowledge 
workers world-wide” (ibid. 19). Bonin et al. (2015; cited in Schroeder, 
2016: 4), applying the Frey and Osborne methodology to Germany, 
suggested that 42% of jobs there could be at risk of automation over a 
20 year period. Schroeder suggests that if one considers “activities” 
instead of “professions” then the predictions are less dramatic – with 
only 12% of jobs in Germany being at risk. Nevertheless, the 
expectant job losses would still fall disproportionately on the low-
skilled and low-paid (ibid.). 
Of course, such predictions should be treated with a modicum of 
caution, as technology can create new jobs as well as destroy current 
ones (Nübler, 2016), so estimating the size of any job-displacement is 
problematic. Wondering where new jobs would come from, though, to 
replace jobs lost to automation is somewhat equally problematic, as 
we cannot fathom that everyone will be – or want to be – a “symbolic 
analyst” (Reich, 1991)  or a creative type  (assuming these skills are 
not possible for AI algorithms to replicate..). Guessing future new job 
roles would be problematic even at the best of times, though, as the 
technological changes driving them could depend upon the coming 
together of as yet unrelated complementary technologies – as has so 
often been the case with recent transformative innovations (e.g., 
biotechnology, ICT). 
As such, one is left with the contentious (some might say 
uncomfortable) notion that the gig economy represents a transition 
from a “wage” economy to a future where the human element is 
desired to be taken out of production altogether by firms seeking to 
cut costs and increase control, with all the attendant implications (“no 
economy?”) of mass unemployment and a lumpen precariat class for 
widespread civil unrest and the growth of right-wing extremism 
(Standing, 2012). Or are these concerns overstated? After all, there is 
a somewhat obvious point that goods and services produced by 
automated systems are intended with consumption by humans in 
mind. That is, issues of automation and consumption are still very 
much grounded in the traditional economic concept of aggregate 
demand; and moreover, effective demand. The implication here being, 
of course, that society would have to have sufficient incomes to 
maintain an effective level of consumption and that political means 
could be used to achieve this. 
However, there are signs that trade unions and government are 
waking up to the potential problems and long-term threats that the 
lack of regulation in the gig economy will have for society. The UK 
Government announced its Good Work Plan to overhaul workers’ 
rights for the 21st Century. Whilst not offering radical change in terms 
of outlawing zero-hours contracts or introducing stringent labour 
requirements for gig employers (per calls from the TUC), the plan is 
potentially a first step in regulating the emerging working environment 
and recognizes the future potential growth of the gig economy. In 
contrast, the German government appears to place a stronger 
emphasis on worker participation in addressing the challenges posed 
by the 4IR, with the establishment of a tripartite framework (the 
“Digital Workplace platform”) under the Labour Ministry, which is 
overseen by the requisite minister and the Chairman of IG Metall, a 
large union conglomerate (Schroeder, 2016: 8). 
As such, the (negative) experiences of workers in the gig economy 
could be seen as a step towards more work-life balance, gender 
equality and concern for community and environmental sustainability 
as opposed to a narrow concern on profit. Rather than solely interpret 
the emergence of the gig economy in negative terms, it could be used 
to re-evaluate the nature of work and the position of work in terms of 
one’s life trajectory. 
Of course, the attendant dangers of work intensification and erosion of 
the boundary between work and leisure that the technology 
underpinning the gig economy has engendered remain ever-present. 
Glamorous notions of being footloose without the trappings of family 
dependents, as depicted in the communal work-living spaces 
espoused by companies such as WeWork/WeLive, have been 
described as preserving a lifestyle – at best – akin to a maintaining a 
university student experience well into one’s 30s (Harris, 2018). As 
such, this needs to be weighed up against the nature of “home”, 
“family” and “community” that some commentators (ibid.) argue such 
arrangements lack. Indeed, as mirrored in the UK housing market 
data presented previously, for many, such patterns of working and 
living might not be by choice, but rather necessity in a fluid, atomised 
labour market. 
Considering the nature of gig work in its wider (precarious work), the 
contingency of labour market participation by those in highly 
precarious forms of work only further reiterates the need for ensuring 
that work “pays”. Moreover, there is a clear imperative to ensure that 
“work” is posited in a wider system of regulation and benefits that aid 
personal and professional development. 
However, the future is ours to shape – hence, the opposite scenarios 
of technological utopia or dystopia are entirely possible. The key point 
is that as technology has evolved to date, so have regulatory 
frameworks designed to limit the negative consequences of the new 
systems of production unleashed thereof. The danger comes from 
growing disenchantment and disengagement from the political 
process that would otherwise act to limit the power of “big tech” 
(government or private corporation). Brexit has certainly highlighted 
the experiences of so-called “left behind communities” in this regard. 
The opportunity is that technology is finally reaching a stage whereby 
it is possible to realise a society where a basic decent standard of 
living is possible for all across the globe and that humanity should live 
without the need for “brute labour”[1]. However, it still remains to be 
seen where these developments will take us. 
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